January 14th, 2015 ~ bobmunson ~ 2 Comments
Although there were many hands of interest, I’m just sticking with the double digit swings. And, I’m excluding one of the double digit swings, since the swing seemed to me to be less about bridge and more about discussing leads and carding before commencing play. It is very important to have a defensive partnership on the same page concerning 3/5th leads or 4th leads. We weren’t. For the 6 hands I include in today’s blog from the Monday game, 5 are mostly about the bidding, but the play/defense was also a factor on a couple of hands.
Here I (East) had a good hand, and it (barely) met my standard for a takeout double with intentions of bidding my own suit later. As it turned out, with the very broken club suit, I actually held more defense than expected and less offense than expected for the first 2 bids. When it came back around for my 3rd bid, the bidding had been the same at both tables. I passed, thinking I had shown around 18 points with a 6 card club suit (pretty much what I had). The auction was over, and we quietly set 3♠ 1 trick. As you can see, at the other table, Nick was holding my cards and thought he had to make one more bid (vulnerable). It is likely that 3♠XX would have been 1 trick short, as it was at my table. Double dummy, all leads that are not small red cards will defeat 3♠ exactly 1 trick, but the West hand was so weak, they decided to retreat to 4♣ rather than risk defending. When 4♣ was doubled, it came up 2 tricks short. +50 at my table and +500 for my N-S teammates at the other table resulted in winning 11 unexpected IMPs.
There is a back story for this next hand. I had just played in the Monterey Regional the prior week. In the Swiss on Sunday, I had a hand I would like to forget. Every Monday, when we are in town, a group of 4 regular players in the Monday afternoon game take a walk. Bruce couldn’t make it on this particular Monday (1/12), but Dan, Manfred and I had a walk Monday morning before bridge Monday afternoon. And, as usual, we spent much of the walk giving the others bridge hands that occurred during the prior week which seemed interesting – usually hands that we got terribly wrong just to see if the others do likewise, or are more wise. So, I gave them this hand:
So, we discussed this hand awhile with both Dan and Manfred heartily agreeing that I screwed up the bidding royally. I said I am never doing this again without taking out insurance. Bid 1 more. If they are making the red slam, the cost will be great. If they would have been down, well, there is always the next hand. But, I cannot let them play 6♦. So, with that background, I present the next hand.
Note that 3 of the 4 players at this table were on the morning walk! I had a great hand as dealer, but passed to await developments. I do think Pass is the correct start to the auction as dealer, since there will be plenty of time to judge later which suit is trump and how high to go. After Dan opened, Manfred simply overcalled 1♥ and we were off to the races. It is not at all clear that the East hand is a preemptive raise. The ♥K may be a useful card on both offense and defense and perhaps a 2♥ cue bid comes closer to showing the values? But, preempts often create problems/chaos in the bidding, so it can hardly be judged an error. In this case, the preempt helped convince me that it was our hand and we were making a lot of tricks! I decided to make a strong raise to 4♥ via the 4♦ cue bid. I certainly have a strong offensive hand, but not so much defense.
In any case, Dan remembered our morning chat and he was not going quietly. He decided to let me guess at the 6 level by jumping to 6♦, and when I guessed to bid the small slam, he took out the (necessary) insurance and bid one more – 7♦!!!!!!!!
I’m not claiming that I bid the hand well. I was clearly very lucky that the major suit kings both could be finessed away for no losers in hearts or spades. Since I didn’t get my club ruff, we ‘only’ scored +1100. The other table only had to contend with a 5♦ call and they played in 5♥, just making when they didn’t bother with one of the finesses. We won 10 IMPs when our teammates were -450.
Here the bidding took on wildly different paths when East, as dealer with 2 quick tricks and a ‘rule of 20’ opener elected to pass. Soon they were playing 3♣ and the cross ruff saw them produce 11 tricks (a late over ruff in diamonds prevented the 12th trick).
When Ed, East at the other table opened, they wound their way into the club slam (Sorry, don’t know the bidding). After a trump lead, Ed played 2 rounds of diamonds and with the ♦Q coming down, the power of the diamond spots produced 1+1+4+6, 12 tricks with the spade ruff for +1370 vs. 150 for 15 IMPs.
Here again, the bidding took wildly different paths. As North, I judged, with my 4-3-3-3 shape and modest strength, the prospect of game was marginal to non-existent. At the other table, the player with my cards tried Ogust and heard ‘good suit, good hand’!? I thought good suit meant 2 of the top 3, and looking at the ♠AK, that isn’t possible. In any case, they decided 9 tricks were easier than 10 and bid 3NT. Actually, double dummy, both sides are entitled to 9 tricks – NS have 9 tricks in the majors, EW have 9/10 tricks in the minors. So, on a diamond lead or small club lead (later shifting to diamonds), +600 for the EW pair after they take the first 10 tricks against 3NT. But, in practice, East began the defense with the ♣AK, and then continued clubs, “knowing” they had 4 tricks and if partner gets 1, that is 5. But the declarer took the next 10 tricks, leaving only the ♦A for trick 13 and -630 for our teammates. In spades, it was trivial to score the 9 tricks that we were due, but our +140 resulted in losing 10 IMPs. Wow! 22 IMPs swung on the opening lead and continuation. Since it is not possible to signal holding the doubleton ♣Q, after 2 rounds of clubs, East has to guess the proper continuation. I’m certain Lead Captain would start the defense against 3NT with a high club. But then again, subsequent defense is always 100% double dummy, so he would always get the defense right. Interesting hand. One side or the other is getting 600 points when North-South is in 3NT. One 600 for offense, one 600 for defense, depending on the lead and continuation.
With the opponents announcing a heart problem for NT, Bruce found the lead of the ♥8. But, no lead beats it. Finally, here is a hand where declarer play made the difference, not the bidding. Here, the final contract was the same at both tables – I don’t know the bidding or the play at the other table. But, Ed played it well at our table (double dummy it cannot be beaten) while the other table was down 2. Ed ducked the heart lead, won the ♥A and led the ♣10. I won the ♣A and tapped dummy with a heart. Ed cashed the ♠A, ruffed a club, cashed 2 top trumps, finessed the ♦Q and played clubs until Bruce ruffed. But Ed had control and took his 10 tricks. So -420 and -100 resulted in lose 11 IMPs.
For our last hand, we had a pretty normal auction to a really optimistic contract. Amazingly, double dummy, there is no defense to defeat 4♠. When the hand with longer diamonds has no entry to provide partner a ruff, and trumps are 3-3 and declarer can finesse the ♠J, winning 3+1+3+3 for 10 tricks, +620. I don’t know the bidding nor play at the other table, but our teammates were -110, so we were lucky to win 11 IMPs on this last board.
December 2nd, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ 2 Comments
Well, the usual – bidding decisions caused all but one of the double digit swings. As I’m leaving tomorrow for Providence, this blog will be fewer hands and less commentary. Here we go…
A strange swing in the first round…
After partner opened 1♣, it was passed out at my table. But at the other table, a reopening double of the 1♣ bid was passed out. Due to my doubleton club, I almost decided to respond 1♥, but decided pass was better. However, had a double come back around to me, I would always run to 1♥ or redouble rather than let partner struggle in 1♣. In the middle of the defense at our table, the ♦A was cashed and another diamond played, allowing declarer to score 5 total tricks, -200. But at the other table, our teammates held declarer to 4 total tricks, scoring +800, winning 12 surprising IMPs.
I felt this hand was quite difficult to bid. Looking at both hands, you would choose to be in 6♣, Obviously, double dummy, 6♣ is cold – simply find the ♣Q. Single dummy, it is pretty routine to play for the drop. 53+%. Not bad odds. However, when the ♣Q failed to drop, our teammates scored +50 to go with our +450 and 11 IMPs. With the 2♣ rebid, possibly partner has a 6 card suit and the importance of the ♣Q is quite diminished. Also, if the ♦K is the ♣Q, 6♣ is a truly outstanding contract. There is probably a way to bid the slam scientifically, but I’m not clear how. I’m sure my 4♠ bid was rather timid, but I couldn’t figure out how to find out partner’s red suit strength. What does East bid at their second turn? Something forcing, but no bid sends the desired message: club support, slam interest, strong spades for source of tricks, but 1 fast heart loser and 2 fast diamond losers. Sometimes you just close your eyes, bid the slam and hope. I think that is what happened here (at the other table).
Here, if South decides to double 4♥, proper technique (and guessing South’s shape) will find 10 tricks (lead small towards dummy’s high hearts twice, then cash side tricks and throw South in at trick 11 to lead into the ♥AJ at trick 12. But, with no double, the ‘obvious way’ to play hearts (lead the ♥Q to finesse), results in -1 due to the power of the ♥9876. At the other table, the players with our cards found their way to 3NT which may or may not be superior to 4♥ in theory, but, in practice, against this layout, 3NT was cold for +630 and +100 for defeating 4♥, so my team lost 12 IMPs.
This is one of the most miserable opening lead problems I have seen, but it turns out the key is the shift at trick 2. Surely leading an ace must be the right start, then figure out what to do. Both tables started with the ♣A. Then it was time to shift. With the heart bid on my right, I wasn’t ready to put the ♥K on the table at trick 2. Instead I tried the ♦10 which went around to the ♦Q and declarer returned a diamond with me winning the ♦A. Now I tried the ♥K, but it was too late and soon declarer wrapped up 10 tricks, pitching his last heart as I ruffed a diamond. At the other table, the ♥K was led at trick 2, establishing the setting trick in hearts before diamonds could be established and 4♠ was down 1. Lose 12 IMPs.
November 13th, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ No Comments
Lots of interesting hands, but only 2 double digit swings. Due to time crunch, I’m not going to recap as many hands as usual, so it will be a shorter blog than normal.
Bidding, play and defense came into play on the swing hands this time, so IMP swings weren’t simply a ‘bidding judgment’ issue, as they often are. The first double digit swing came on Board 2.
The bidding started the same at both tables, but South’s rebid over partner’s balancing 1♥ call made all the difference. At my table, the auction ended with 1♠, while at the other table, the 1NT call by South was raised to 2NT, reraised to 3NT and 9 tricks were there for +600 for teammates vs. -110 for us. Win 10 IMPs.
Here, as East, I failed to appreciate my Jacks, and 4-3-3-3 is always a disappointment. However, partner’s 6=3=3=1 shape proved exceptionally useful and with the lead of the ♦K, 12 tricks were quickly there. At the other table, North opened 1♦, and the opponents holding my cards soon got to the spade game, but when they scored less than 12 tricks, we ‘only’ lost 9 IMPs. I’m not usually a timid bidder, but clearly the blame is all on me for this one.
The contract (and, I think, bidding) was the same at both tables and the initial play started out the same – lead singleton ♦10 (♦Q, ♦A, ruff, club to ♣A with ♣Q falling from declarer’s hand, looking like a singleton). At this point, double dummy, the hand can no longer be made. At my table, declarer ruffed a club, ‘finessed’ hearts, ruffed another club and eventually lost control, allowing partner to ruff a spade for the setting trick. Communication between the hands is challenging. Our teammate (Chris), playing 4♥ at the other table cashed the ♥A at trick 5. When the ♥K fell under the ♥A, he had hope. He drew trump and led the ♠Q. When that was covered, he was home because he can reenter his hand with the ♠J and then ruff out the ♠10 while he still has a trump to ruff a club back to his hand and cash winners. If the ♠K is not covered, the transportation isn’t there to run 10 tricks. Based on the fall of the ♣Q and partner’s encouraging club card when clubs were led at trick 4, it looks like declarer might be 4=4=4=1. If so, even if the ♠Q is a Chinese finesse (lacking the ♠J), it is not necessary to cover and it proved to be fatal to cover the ♠Q.
But, if declarer is 3=4=5=1 holding ♠Qxx and ♦Jxxxx, failure to cover the ♠Q is the only way to allow the hopeless game to make! Bridge can be a tough game. The size of the diamond that partner led at trick 3 for the ruff is not a count card, it is the lowest diamond saying ‘lead clubs’ after you ruff this diamond trick, so there is no way I know of for South to signal count in diamonds. Win 12 lucky IMPs.
Here, I got to the ‘obvious’ contract which happened to be cold against any defense. Except I am playing it doubled. The bidding was the same at the other table except for the final double. I managed -500 when Manfred mistakenly played the wrong card at trick 1 and allowed my ♥10 to win. All I need to do is lead a club to the ♣9 and I am home with 8 tricks, +380. And, had Manfred correctly won the ♥J at trick 1, shifting to spades at trick 2, I am still good for 7 tricks if I get the clubs right. I think I should have gotten clubs right, based on the double, but I can blame some confusion on the ‘impossible’ ♥10 winning trick 1 and not knowing what is going on. That is a lame excuse. Manfred has to hold the ♣K for his double of 1NT. If he has the ♣J too (so that my ♣9 loses to the ♣J), I can still get to dummy later with the ♦A to lead the now singleton ♣Q to finesse the ♣K, so that I am still making 7 tricks if he started with ♣KJx. Our teammates were disappointed, when they picked up +300 and lost 5 IMPs! Their declarer didn’t have the early warning from the penalty double, so they played clubs normally and ended up with only their top 4 tricks. But, having been warned by the double, I should have made it. Lose 5 IMPs instead of win 12.
I guess I have time for one more hand.
This one was a push. Also a comedy. But 12 easy IMPs were available for the side that managed to defeat the hopeless spade game. Both defenses let the contract through for +620 at both tables and a push, no IMPs for either team. The defense collects the first 4 tricks after a heart lead, diamond to the ♦A and then another heart lead for 2 more hearts.
How does partner know to chose hearts over clubs? Beats me. But read on.
Leads are important. I have mentioned the Lead Captain program for many months. However, for this lead, I didn’t bother running the program because the principle was spelled out in David Bird’s book. That is, amazingly often, you do not want to lead the A from Axx(x) in a suit partner bid. Sometimes declarer holds the key missing high cards and your high card can be better used later. On this hand against 4♠, the ♦A was led at the other table and the lucky lie of the cards meant the contract can no longer go down, since the fall of the club suit allows a heart discard.
There has been a lot written about what to lead from xxx. Some lead high to show lack of interest, some low to show lack of a doubleton and some lead middle to try to blend those 2 messages together (referred to as MUD leads). I pretty much always lead low unless I supported the suit and want to tell partner I have nothing in a suit that I bid. This time Jerry chose the ♥7. Partner, believing that it was a doubleton, won, cashed the ♥A and led the 3rd round for the ruff…that never came. So, with only 2 heart losers and 1 diamond loser, 10 tricks were there.
At my table, partner and I were pretty aggressive in the bidding. There is much more in the literature about direct takeout doubles (followup bids after the initial double), but little mention of the strength required to raise, double raise or triple raise a response to a balancing double of a 1 bid. Dan’s decision to triple raise, holding the East cards, is from some book I haven’t yet read. Sorry Dan.
With my partner making ‘only’ a double raise of my 1♠ bid, it left room for South (Bob Pastor) to stick in a lead director bid of 4♥! I should have passed, because they have no where to go and partner would hopefully have doubled them, whether they attempted 4♥ on their 3-3 fit, or went on to 5♦. Either way, they were doomed for a large penalty once the 4♥ bid was made. But I took them off the hook by bidding the spade game holding very modest values. So, lots of strange bidding and problematic leads resulted in a vulnerable game coming home at both tables.
October 16th, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ 6 Comments
Once more bidding decisions accounted for almost all large swings. There were many hands of potential swings and smaller swings that were interesting, but without BBO, it is sufficiently tedious to enter the hands and get it right that I’ll stick with the 6 hands that were double digit. Two slam swings (unfavorable, involving my decisions) were especially disappointing making the total IMPs for the day a big disappointment. You be the judge. I’ll start with a pop quiz, not exactly representing the hand at the table, and see what you do? No one vulnerable and no opponent bidding, you hold:
After you open 1♦, you hear 1♥. Your turn? There seems to be only 2 choices, invitational raise to 3♥, a raise to 4♥ or a game forcing splinter of 4♣. Your call?
Now I’ll begin with the real hands that happened. It all started on board 1.
South heard the club preempt at the other table and considered passing for penalty (assuming partner reopens with a double), but they decided to bid their strong suit with their strong hand. When North raised to game, the auction was over. At my table, hearing no club bid, I held out hopes for slam and made the ambiguous slam invite of 5♠ (good trumps? good hand in context? Anything extra you haven’t shown?). I’ve certainly been in much worse slams, but partner declined my invite. Here, a 2-2 trump break makes slam cold (as long as there is no ruff on the opening lead). And 3-1 trumps still make the 5 level safe. But no. Trumps were 4-0 offside, resulting in -50 paired with -420 to lose 10 IMPs. Not exactly a slam swing, but it felt like one.
Is this hand a bidding problem, opening lead problem, or declarer problem? It turned out to be all 3. Both tables began with 1♣ – 1NT. At my table, partner, seeing their 6 card heart suit, came in with 2♥, preventing a transfer by East. East merely bid 2♠ and ended the auction. But the North hand passed at the other table, allowing a transfer to spades, after a free bid of 3♠ was considered an invite which resulted in reaching the shaky 4♠ game. It is curious that North’s bid at one table had the effect of shutting out game, while South’s second round bid had the effect of pushing them into game. Even though the ♣A figures to be onside, counting on the ♦AK onside and hoping that they don’t obtain a nearly certain diamond ruff is a bit much to hope for.
Clearly the game is easily down on 3 rounds of diamonds, with partner ruffing the 3rd round. But, what is the best lead by South against 4♠? Should you lead your singleton, or try to give partner a club or diamond ruff by leading one of your aces? Readers of the blog will know that I answer all opening lead questions by going to Lead Captain – software that can determine the best lead assuming you have accurately captured what you ‘know’ about the unseen hands. Lead Captain heavily favors singleton leads (in general), but here, it is impossible for partner to hold the ♥ ace and partner is unlikely to gain the lead to give you a ruff. So, it is not surprising that the ace leads come out on top as shown here:
Against a contract of only 2♠ all leads by South are hopeless, but I led the ♥6, ‘partner’s suit’ and declarer quickly scored his 10 tricks. Our teammates (who arrived in 4♠ by West) had the North hand on lead. They also led partner’s suit, clubs. South won the ♣A, cashed the ♦K, couldn’t read partner’s card and did not continue diamonds. Now the contract seems cold, but declarer went astray and finished -2. -170 and -200, lose 9 IMPs (not quite double digit, but seemed close enough to double digit to include in the blog).
When I ran Lead Captain for the North hand, it was close to a 13 way tie for first/last regarding the best card to lead against 4♠. No lead really stood out. So, I guess it isn’t really an opening lead problem after all, but since it is my blog, I can write about whatever I want to write about! Opening leads fascinate me.
Instead, the problem is what South should do against 4♠ by West at trick 2/3/4 after winning trick 1 with the ♣A? In any case, without a diamond ruff, the contract failed anyway, so no accurate defense was required after all. Since I was interested in the results of the best opening lead by South, I went ahead and included the Lead Captain report for the South hand, even though that was not the hand on lead against the shaky game. As shown by Lead Captain, aces often make good leads (I used to say “take all your suits with aces, set them aside, then figure out what to lead from the suits that remain”), but Lead Captain is showing the power of ace leads. Not that they are that great in and of themselves, but if you can read dummy and partner’s signal, you can often win the first trick and get the continuation right – in effect, leading at trick 2 what you should have led at trick 1, and just as effective as if you had led it at trick 1 to start with. Aces on air, setting up declarer’s kings, will rarely be effective defense, but it still turns out that aces are amazingly more effective as opening leads than I had ever imagined.
You might think that “of course AK leads are ‘always’ best” but another hand later in the day saw an AK lead become the fatal way to lose 300 points (+500 vs. +800) defending a vulnerable 3♦ preempt that was doubled in the pass out seat and then passed out to play there. That data point doesn’t make AK leads bad, but they are not as good as they are cracked up to be. And, leading the ace from ace empty is not as bad as its reputation.
Here, very different bidding at the two tables achieved the double game swing (for my opponents). I’m not too proud of my 2♠ call. Pass is likely better, and bidding 3♠ makes more sense than 2♠. But, my shape was so bad that 3♠ seemed too rich and I opted to bid only 2♠. If partner knew I held 4 spades (which he would, had I tried 3♠), he might have found the 5♠ call. I suppose, in theory, partner’s pass over 5♣ was forcing, but looking at my hand, with so little offense or defense, I opted to pass out 5♣. Wrong! There was very little to the play, as both 5♣ and 5♠ made easily. I don’t know how, but the score in the other room was -480. Making 6♠ seems a stretch, but the score didn’t matter. -400 coupled with -480 was 13 IMPs away. Law of Total Tricks fans will note the discrepancy of 3 tricks. 22 total tricks but only 19 total trumps. Double fits do amazing things.
Board 18 is a very tough hand to bid. The results seem a bit random. 3NT and 5 of a minor are both impossible, so you are looking at some contract in a major. There are 4-3 fits with 3-3 splits in both majors to consider as you choose your trump suit. If you choose hearts, you make 10 tricks and spades will only make 9 tricks. This hand is another example of the documented bridge theory (Vondracek phenomenon) that, given choices between equal length holdings, choose the weaker one as the trump suit (here, hearts ♥KQJ are weaker than spades ♠AKJ). I’m not sure how you figure that out accurately during this auction. My opponents played 3♠ making 3 and our teammates played 4♥ making 4. +620 vs. -140, win 10 IMPs for the red game.
Bruce had diamond support, but modest points and sterile distribution, so he stayed out of the auction. I don’t have the full auction, but at the other table East preempted with 3♦ over the double and soon after the opponents were in their cold heart game. Bidding can make it tough on the opponents, but it can also force them into games they would not bid of their own accord.
Board 23 also proved very tough to bid. Our opponents at my table played 4♠ down 2, and our teammates defended 3NT down 4. All about bidding, not much to play or defense. +200 and +400 won 12 IMPs.
Board 27 has the hand that I gave you at the start of the blog, only different. Even though some may bid a splinter with the initial hand (singleton ♣2), I think very few players would consider the splinter a full valued automatic bid, even vulnerable. The diamonds are nice, but the spots in hearts and spades are very weak.
But, the hand I gave at the start was a lie. The actual hand held the singleton ♣K, not the ♣2. Does that upgrade the hand so that it is now worth a 4♣ splinter? I thought it was very close, but decided against it and simply raised to 3♥. Chris did bid the splinter and was rewarded with the slam swing. My partner considered offering a 3♠ cue bid over my 3♥ bid on the way to 4♥, but eventually just accepted my invite and our auction died at 4♥. I’ve given the hand to a number of strong players and, while some side with me and bid only 3♥, most favor Chris’ 4♣ splinter or even a simple 4♥ call. If I’m going to force game, I feel like I should show the splinter along the way, just in case that is magic to partner’s hand. Lose 11 IMPs.
September 9th, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ 1 Comment
Per usual, I’m just reporting the hands where the large swings occurred. One swing was due to different defense, but the rest were all either bidding judgment or in some cases confusion about bidding systems.
I want to open the blog with one opening lead problem. After this auction:
You are on lead with this:
What’s your choice? “answer” at the end…
Now onto the hands with the big swings
The first hand was especially disappointing because we (many of the players who play in this game including me and my partner) have had recent discussions (phone call, email, live) with Gene Simpson about a particular auction. Gene has proposed that (opponents passing), after 1♣-1♥-1♠-2♦ that partner may be stuck for a bid and the partnership should agree that 2♠ is a punt, simply stating that you cannot support partner’s suit, nor bid NT due to no stopper in the unbid suit and, when you hold a real 5-x-x-6 hand, bid just bid 3♠ over 2♦. Unfortunately, I was playing with my regular partner and I thought we had this ‘agreement’ based on the extensive discussion that had been held. He did not think that agreement was in place! So, we floundered into 4NT, making 11 tricks. I’m not sure 6♠ is a great slam, but it made. Bruce and I were playing X-Y-Z where 2♦ was game forcing, much like a normal 2♥ bid which is a 4th suit game forcing bid. With the friendly suits, the 6♠ contract made easily in the other room, lose 13 IMPs.
It seems like there are lots of hands coming up where opener has 4=4 in the minors and must choose a suit to open. Bruce and I have adopted ‘nearly always open 1♣‘ (very long side discussion I won’t get into here) but others still use judgment and vary the suit to be opened based on various considerations. Here, I am not sure it should have mattered (1NT can still be the overcall bid whether diamonds or clubs are opened), but but after the 1♦ opening bid, Mike opted for 2♣ and bought it there, making an overtrick. When our teammate (Dan, South) heard the 1♣ opening bid, he overcalled 1NT, Ed (North) bid 3♠ (a game forcing 5-5 in the majors) and Dan closed out the bidding with 3NT, making when the suits and cards were friendly. Win 10 IMPs for the red game bid by our teammates.
This was the hand where defense made the difference. At my table, Jack had no trouble, seeing club ruffs in dummy, so he led his spade at trick 2. When the ♠A was won and another spade led to trick 3, I was looking at very limited possibilities for 10 tricks. I thought it was barely possible to lose a heart to RHO, get a club ruff, draw trump and run hearts, scoring 5+4+0+1. So, at trick 3, I won the ♠10 in my hand to start the heart attack. LHO (Ed) went up with the ♥J. So much for ducking a heart to RHO. Now, I think my only legitimate play to make the hand is for ♥QJx onside. So, I won the ♥A, drew trumps, took the heart finesse and was quickly down 3. After the spade return at trick 2, I can easily score 8 tricks by getting my single club ruff, but 8 was the max possible on this defense, and since I was contracted for 10 tricks, I tried to find 10.
A remarkably different auction at the other table with the same cards, with EW also arriving in 4♠ with the same ♦10 lead. South saw an opportunity to give partner a diamond ruff and after the ♦AK start, declarer soon had 10 tricks (6+2+1+1) with 2 club ruffs and the ♦J scored in dummy. -420 and -150, lose 11 IMPs.
South didn’t open at the other table and Bruce (as do I) viewed the West hand too strong for opening 1NT (17 HCP plus 1 length point makes 18 and out of range for 15-17). After Bruce opened 1♦, a Michaels 2♦ bid quickly got NS to the spade game, making 5. But, at my table, as you see above, Jack decided to open this hand (rule of 19?) with 1♦. Here, I did not think I was too strong to overcall 1NT which is 15-18. Most players in the group play Hamilton by North in this situation, but Ed thought it wasn’t really right to come out and say ‘do we play Hamilton after 1NT overcalls?’ and, playing with an unfamiliar partner, he simply bid what he thought he could make. His 2♠ ended the auction, making 6 when declarer ruffed out my ♣K, allowing the diamond to be pitched. Win 9 IMPs. Very strange that when South did not open, 4♠ was quickly reached by NS, but when South did open, the 1NT interference resulted in game being missed. But, in fairness, Ed was severely hampered by not feeling right about having a bidding discussion at that point in the auction. A Hamilton bid (by North) of 2♦ showing both majors would have gotten to the lay down game.
Dan decided to open 2♣, and, eventually, when 7♦ came around to him, bid one more. When the ♣A was offside, he finished -1. Ed opened 1♠, and I offered a rather bare bones splinter. Soon we were in the cold slam when I failed to show Ed the ♣A. Win 17 IMPs.
This was the last hand of the day, and a sad one. In 4th chair sandwiched between 2 bidding opponents, I noticed that spades had not yet been bid and thought it highly unlikely that partner could have the cards needed for our side to make 3NT. On top of that, I thought my preempt in this situation (red vs. white with a passing partner and bidding opponents) showed a very fine hand. So, I opted for the preempt of 3♣, buying it and making 5 when the opponents set up the ♠10 for a heart discard. When a mere 2♣ was bid at the other table, partner responded 2NT and was raised to 3NT, making 4. Our side lost 10 IMPs. Sorry teammates.
Here is the opening lead problem from the start of the blog. I mentioned in a prior post that Bob Richardson has developed a program to take any hand and find the best opening lead against any contract (using user defined bounds for the remaining hands at the table). You can then find 5000 (or whatever you choose) hands that fit those paramenters, play them double dummy, and determine which card is the most successful lead the most often. On the hand I gave at the start of the post, here is the output from Lead Captain.
I’m new at trying to insert images like this and it looks pretty blurry, but if you want to view it in detail, just click on it and it will be bigger. The image above shows the output from Lead Captain suggesting the ♦A is the best lead (but not by a wide margin) based on a sampling of 5000 hands. This assumes that I accurately described LHO, Partner and RHO. You can learn more about Lead Captain here:
http://www.bridgecaptain.com/LeadCaptain.html
So, what happened at the table? Nothing good. The lead of the ♦A was the only lead to ensure defeat, but that lead was not found at the table that was defending 4♠X. Due to the ill-advised double, declarer found the ♠Q (so now the contract is cold), but declarer never led diamonds, compressed club honors and found a way to go down. I was North at the other table. Not knowing what to lead, fearing that with my meager defense that 4♠ was making (it was not, without the double, even if the ♦A isn’t led), and thinking with a magical fit, 5♥ might make, I bid the ridiculous vulnerable 5♥, which got doubled and when all 3 aces cashed, I was down one. -200 paired with -100 to lose 7 IMPs. Had 4♠X come home, we could have won 9 IMPs. A 16 IMP swing in spite of my 5♥ bid. Here’s the hand:
August 21st, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ 3 Comments
Once more, with today’s hands, almost all large swings were driven by bidding judgment, but defense (and opening leads) did play a role in a couple of hands.
On this first hand, many things happened. First, I passed a takeout double, thinking we might get rich off the vulnerable opponents. Then, when declarer went wrong in the trump suit, I failed to beat the contract. On top of all of that, there was an ethical question. Can I, should I, alert declarer that I have passed a takeout double and, if so, how and when? Or do I require him to ask and remain silent if he fails to ask? The auction had a sound to it of a penalty double (that East, Bruce, held strong hearts). But, my partner and I have specifically discussed and agreed that all low level doubles are takeout. So, in spite of my failing to offer diamonds, hearts or spades over their 1♣ opening bid, the subsequent double of the 2♥ overcall is takeout. It shows short hearts and a desire to compete. I took partner for a better hand and thought that my extra defense combined with his (my imagination) extra defense could score a big number. Still, my pass was a big position that was wrong and I paid out 13 IMPs when 2♥X came home.
On hand evaluation, I almost always add 1 point for all cards past 4 in any suit. Here, that would get me up to 11 points, worth a 2NT response. I could also simply respond 1♦. Instead, I chose the preemptive value of 1NT, but didn’t judge the hand (only 10 HCP) worthy of an 11-12 2NT response. I wish I had. The auction began the same at the other table and when North did not overcall 2♥, our opponents bought it for 1NT at the other table, bringing in 10 tricks when the defense was not optimal.
Back to our defense against 2♥X, partner began with the ♦J (Rusinow), ducked all around, and continued with the ♦Q which declarer (Mark) won. Mark now, thinking Bruce held the heart strength, floated the ♥10 to my ♥J. If I simply play clubs now, I will eventually get a ruff, scoring all 3 trumps, a diamond plus 2 black aces for down one. However, I attempted to cash the ♦K (hopeless, since we lead top from a doubleton, so pard holds 3 diamonds) and when declarer ruffed, my club ruff was no longer possible and -670 along with -180 scored -13 IMPs. Clearly, there is no chance to defeat the contract if Mark knows I hold the penalty pass rather than Bruce holding the penalty double. Mark will find the ♥J and, even if I score my club ruff, I will not get all 3 trump tricks. This (what is right/ethical in terms of clarifying to declarer how to play the hand) seems to me to be a murky area of the laws. Anyone reading this with insight on this topic is welcome to comment.
Board 5 provided an extreme example of adding points for the cards in a suit past the 4th card held. I held 13 HCP, but evaluated the hand at 16 Total Points. Thus, we had the auction shown. At the other table, it was a quick 1NT-3NT. When no spade lead appeared to cash the ♠A at trick 1, all 13 tricks were scored at both tables when the heart squeeze against the ♠A prevented the defense from getting any tricks. Win 13 IMPs for the vulnerable slam.
Hand 6, yet another example of adding points (here only 1 point) for the 5th card in a suit. Opposite 1NT (15-17), everyone will invite with 9 HCP. Here there were only 8 HCP, but 9 TP when adding 1 for distribution – the long diamond suit has potential and, as it proved in the play of the hand, diamonds were the key to declarer arriving at 9 tricks. So, at my table, they proceeded to 3NT. The spade lead at our table knocked out one of the crucial entries to diamonds. But, when the ♦K could not be held up, the long diamond suit provided the needed tricks for +600. At the other table, responder only saw 8 HCP and did not invite, languishing in 1NT. A heart was led, allowing leisurely development of diamonds and 10 total tricks, but the 1NT contract only scored +180 vs. -600, lose 9 IMPs.
Epilog – the hand is much more likely to be really worth 9 TP if the outside A or K (either one) had been in the diamond suit with the ♦J. It would be much more likely that the length could be enjoyed. With the actual spade lead that partner found, the contract requires the singleton or doubleton ♦K to come down in order to see his way to 9 tricks. So, there was definitely an element of luck with the ♦K coming down vs. skill in hand evaluation.
On Board 11, the weakest hand at the table made the big decision at our table. Making 10 tricks in hearts proved easy for our opponents at the other table. At my table, our opponents persisted to the minor suit save against 4♥. Partner doubled (good, since we cannot score 11 tricks in 5♥), but when he chose to lead trumps at trick one (cut down on ruffs?), it became a very good ‘save’ indeed since we could no longer defeat 5♦. -550 and -420, lose 14 IMPs. Leading trumps vs. a save has been a recommended action over the years, but David Bird’s book argues against that. His models showed that attacking, usually starting with the suit we have bid, is a better initial salvo. One of the readers of my blog (Bob Richardson) actually has the programming skills to create a program (Lead Captain) to run the numbers much like Bird did and find out what lead will work best. That is, the program generates 5000 (or whatever number you chose) hands which are consistent with the holding of the opening leader and the bidding. It then shows percentages of success for the various choices of opening leads, given the hand patterns input for the auction chosen. He has recently completed the program and you can learn more about it here:
http://www.bridgecaptain.com/LeadCaptain.html
I expect to have another blog about Lead Captain soon, but I wanted to make readers aware of it. I ran a simulation for this specific hand and, assuming I accurately reflected what the hands should be for the auction that occurred, it suggested that the trump lead would not be best. A heart turned out to be the best choice in the simulation, followed closely by a club.
In any case, 8 of our IMPs were lost in the bidding when our teammates did not bid on over 4♥. Even if we beat 5♦ (+100 vs. -420) we lose 8 IMPs, but the other 6 IMPs were lost when we failed to defeat the sacrifice.
Wow. My partner’s 3♦ preempt prompted an attempt at 3NT by North. When I doubled, North saw nowhere to run. Should South pull it to 4♣? Certainly that would work better on this hand, but I don’t know if that is the percentage action. The 3♦ preempt didn’t happen at the other table.
On the run of the hearts, partner discouraged in diamonds, but I got out with the ♦K in any case. So, declarer was able to score 4 tricks with ♦AQ and ♣AK, +1400 vs. -450 in the heart game at the other table, my side won 14 IMPs. Preempts were designed to present problems to the opponents. Sometimes the problems get solved and sometimes…
This hand is worth a comment about our opponents at the other table (holding our cards) reaching the heart game after the opponents open 1NT. Most of us play Woolsey over a NT opening bid. Here is the auction:
Well done! Hard to get to game when the opponents open 1NT.
On Board 16, as East-West, we defended against 2NT by North at our table. Declarer had their 7 top tricks, but we took the other 6 for down 1. Seemed OK at the time. This discussion is about the other table.
I don’t know how to attribute the cause of the swing on this hand based on the result at the other table. The bidding was not good, the contract was hopeless, but the defense conspired to allow the contract through. I have had a difficult time figuring out how to write up the hand. It has double dummy complications (a totally unexpected singleton ♥K, whch, when not led early, provides an unsuspecting declarer a play for the contract that, in practice, did not even cross the declarer’s mind. You be the judge.
With West having a minimum opening hand and only 3 card spade support, there’s not much to explain the 3♠ call other than it was his turn to bid. Bruce advanced to the spade game, thinking it might be a 2-way shot. They were in (he thought) a 4-4 fit and that, as declarer, he might have a source of tricks in diamonds or, bidding the red game, it might prompt the opponents to take a save in 5♣. Double dummy, the defense is due 5 tricks against 4♠. But to achieve down 2, hearts must be led early by the defense. Trick 1 or 2! If the singleton heart had been the ♥2, the defense wouldn’t be too hard to find. Many people, when presented with a singleton, lead it. As it turns out, the singleton ♥K (unknown to declarer) is the key, late in the hand, to have a legitimate play to make 4♠ when the best defense is not found early. But, the key to the defense is to get the singleton heart led early, threatening heart ruff(s). If the ♥K is led at trick 2, declarer has no answer and 8 tricks is the max.
I want to take a closer look at the opening lead. In David Bird’s book on Opening Leads, he often pointed out how fruitless it can often be to lead from KQJxxx (a forcing game notwithstanding). Standard beliefs about opening leads has always thought this was a pretty good (and safe) start to the defense. But, in reality, in one hand or the other, declarer will often be short and few tricks will be available to the defense in this suit. Often it is better to look elsewhere for tricks. Also, David Bird suggests that a singleton lead (even a singleton K) is a good start to the defense. Once again, I’m going to deploy Lead Captain to examine the opening lead. Lead Captain is software (mentioned above) where you input the hand that is on lead, describe the dummy, declarer and partner’s hands as you understand their hands from the auction, and then generate 5000 (or whatever you choose) deals which match that description. Then try every lead (all possible 13 cards) and see which leads work (playing and defending double dummy) most often (and, with further research, you can find out why is it that that lead works so well).
The results of my simulation showed a diamond lead was best, followed reasonably closely by the ♥K. All clubs were nearly the same (no one would lead a small club from this holding, but the simulation doesn’t care what ‘no one’ would do, it tries them all!). Somewhat surprisingly, all club leads were virtually tied with a trump lead for the worst possible lead. On this specific hand, a trump lead is useless and hopeless, allowing the contract to make double dummy, where an initial club lead (again, on this specific hand) is no harm, no foul. At trick 2, after cashing your club, you can still switch to the ♥K that you should have led at trick 1 and survive. David Bird loves singleton leads, hates trump leads, and assuming I described the hands correctly, the singleton ♥K, while not the best in the 5000 deal simulation, is one of the top leads to choose from this hand.
On this layout (the actual hand dealt vs. what the simulation of 5000 deals showed) the ♥K is especially effective (but cashing 1 club, then shifting to the ♥K works just as well). After that start, achieving 8 tricks (down 2) by declarer takes very careful (actually double dummy) play. A much more likely result, single dummy, is -300 or -400 if the ♥K is led at trick 1 or 2.
But, the actual defense began with two rounds of clubs, tapping declarer. This seems like a reasonable start due to the precarious 4-3 trump fit being tapped in the long hand at trick 2. In fact, due to the ♥K coming down (creating an entry for the useful diamond suit via the ♥Q), double dummy the contract is now cold after the club continuation at trick 2 (declarer ruffs the club in his hand at trick 2). But, look at the problem from declarer’s (single dummy) viewpoint: He has lost a club, must lose a diamond, has no where to pitch his nearly certain heart loser, and needs to negotiate the spade suit for no losers. So, it is time to start drawing trumps, hoping for 3=3 with the ♠K on side. But, so what? When you are done drawing trumps, unless the ♦A is singleton, you have no way (that you know of) back to your hand to enjoy diamond tricks. One thing at a time. You lead the spade 10. If RHO holds up the ♠K, declarer is in serious trouble (unless, again, he plays double dummy). If declarer leads trumps again and repeats the spade finesse after the holdup of the ♠K, -400. He has no tricks. But, RHO helpfully won the first round of spades and persisted in clubs (removing North-South communication with South’s threatening club tricks). Declarer ruffed the club return (of course) and played 2 more rounds of trump, successfully drawing them upon finding them 3-3. But, on the last round of trumps, he has no more trumps and must discard. Double dummy he must pitch a diamond, preserving his ♥Q ‘entry’ to the diamonds. In practice, he pitched his ‘losing’ heart and kept all of his diamonds. He next led the ♦K. If RHO ducks his ♦A, declarer will be back to 8 tricks, since that ♦K will be the only diamond trick he scores. But, RHO grabbed the ♦A and that was the last trick for the defense. Making 10 tricks. 4+1+5+0. Incredible.
Declarer had heard partner open 1♥, but declarer never supported hearts. Looking at dummy and his own hand, North could see 10 of the hearts (11 counting the heart discard declarer made on the last round of spades). That leaves only the ♥KQ outstanding. Declarer is unlikely to hold the remaining ♥KQ having never raised hearts. Also, he is unlikely to have pitched down to a singleton ♥K (but, if he did hold the ♥K or ♥KQ, the rest of the tricks are his anyway). So, a holdup play on the diamond is required, severing communication to declarers long strong diamonds. When the ♦A holdup wasn’t found, my side lost 11 IMPs, +50 vs. -620.
Board 22, I was sitting West, and the bidding was not obvious to me. After hearing 1♣ – (P) I had to respond. I considered 1♦, 2♣, and 2NT. Thinking it would be better for the lead to come up to partner, I settled on 2♣. Partner, with a maximum (below NT range) balanced hand, would seem to have a 3NT call. Instead I heard 3♣ and had to decide what to do. We have ‘understandings’ – don’t bring back +170 or +150 when red. So, looking at my prime cards, I decided to try 3NT.
Now I’m the declarer, and, if the bidding wasn’t obvious, the play was also not obvious. Clearly win the opening diamond lead. Assuming LHO holds ♦QJ, I am up to 3 diamond tricks, 2 hearts and 4 spades are possible for 9 tricks, without relying upon the ♣A being on side. I wondered why LHO would attack diamonds if he held useful cards in spades, and so I placed ♠Q9xx of spades in my RHO’s hand. So, the ‘obvious’ thing to do is to lead a spade to the 7. Oops – LHO wins the ♠9 and after some pause, continues with the ♦J. OK, I’m up to 4 diamond tricks, so 3 spades and 2 hearts will see me to 9 tricks without the dreaded reliance upon the ♣A being onside. I decided LHO had club length including the ♣A. Why is he leading a 3 card suit? So, after winning the ♦K in dummy, I led a spade to the ♠10. Oops. That lost too!! Somehow my 4 spade tricks has dropped to the 2 I started with (♠A and ♠K). So, I proceeded to run my diamonds and hearts and spades, relying upon an endplay on LHO to score my ♣K. Boy was I surprised when I finally led a club off dummy and the ♣A came up on my right. But, thankfully, he was left with only 1 heart to cash and the ♣K was my 9th trick at trick 13. When I was reviewing my ‘play’ of this hand with Bruce, I reported that the opponents won 2 spade tricks! He said ‘that is not possible!!!!!’ Yet, I proved it was possible. Not a shining example of my declarer play or card reading skills. Still, when game was not reached at the other table, we won 10 IMPs.
The last hand of the day was roughly a 50% slam depending upon a finesse of the trump J. Since the ♥J was on side, there wasn’t much to the play in 6♥. I like the auction by my opponents at our table where they arrived at the successful slam. It is very difficult opening 2♣ with three suited hands, so both North players decided to open 1♥. The jump shift in diamonds could have found a diamond suit in dummy much like the actual club suit that they held. If so, 6♦ would have been an outstanding contract. The other table tried a reverse into into spades. But, partner cannot look at their hand and get excited upon hearing spades. They hold at most the ♠J and at most 3 spades – so nothing about their spade holding can be very slam positive. So, after the spade reverse at the other table, South jumped to 3NT (clubs and diamonds well stopped), ending the auction. Should North make one more try over 3NT? Beats me. At my table, as you can see from the auction presented, the diamond jump shift left Bruce thinking he had to do something with his extra values. When he jumped to 4♥, ostensibly showing a 3 card limit raise, pard leapt to the heart slam and was rewarded with 11 IMPs when the ♥J proved to be on side.
July 15th, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ 2 Comments
Form returned to normal yesterday. By that, I mean that there were 7 swings greater than 5 IMPs and all 7 involved variance in bidding decisions. Certainly there were opportunities in play, defense and opening leads on many hands, but bidding differences seems to always be where the swings occur.
It all started on Board 1. The bidding was the same at both tables up through 4♥. The critical bidding decision arrived. Partner, Bruce, decided to make one try with 4♠, I cooperated with 5♣, and there we were, in 6♥. It turned out to be a very decent slam with the diamond finesse a successful fallback when the ♥Q did not drop in 1 or 2 rounds (if I computed right, this is a little better than 59% slam). Plus 980 vs. 480, win 11 IMPs.
Another ‘slam’ came up on Board 4. The varied choice (3♦/4♦) for opening the bidding had a dramatic effect on the final result. As the auction progressed, I had a very bad feeling about this hand. It is not often you can double the opponents at the 5 level, surrender an overtrick, lose -950 and still win 13 IMPs! Our teammates came through for us. Jerry liked his hand a lot when partner (Dan) produced a 4♦ vulnerable opening bid in 2nd seat, so he bounced to 6♦ which promptly got doubled.
Back to my table, I was on lead against 5♦X, and I commented (doing the math) as I put the opening lead (♣Q) face down, “-1150 for 2 overtricks?” Declarer drew one round of trump prior to beginning the spade suit, so he eventually had to lose a trick to the ♥A. Spades were established, but there was no entry. At the other table, the opening lead was the ♠K, so declarer was off to the races, bringing in all 13 tricks when the spades came home after two ruffs and he still had an entry to use the established spades for two heart discards. +1740 vs. -950, win 13 IMPs.
Yet another ‘slam’ on Board 5. This time there were not a lot of extra arrows in the quiver. Either the ♠Q was onside or not. It was not. I lost -450, teammates -50, lose 11 IMPs.
On this hand, the slam prospects are difficult to judge during the auction. Both players knew that the ♦Q had no value (and short diamonds opposite short diamonds never bodes well). As long as trumps are 3-2, had there been a 5th club in dummy to provide a spade discard, no spade finesse would have been needed for 12 tricks. There was lots of power between the two hands, but no long suits, no source of tricks and 11 tricks proved to be the limit. This is one of the super frustrating aspects of bridge, IMP bridge in particular. Here, there were 22 IMPs at stake. One side is winning 11 IMPs and one side is losing 11 IMPs and it all hinges on the 50-50 location of the ♠Q.
Another issue in the bidding is whether opener is ‘too strong’ to splinter? I think that is what Mark decided when he rebid 2♠ and then jumped to 4♥. It is interesting that Dan (Mark’s partner) chose not to pursue slam after the sequence shown, and when the splinter was the bid chosen at the other table, partner proceeded to the ill fated slam.
On Board 16, 4th chair (South) had the critical bidding decision to make after hearing (1♠)-P-(1NT)-? At my table, they chose 2♦, Jerry rebid 2♥ (saying later that he has never freely made two bids in two suits of poorer quality!). That was passed out and with the cards so friendly and the defense not optimum, partner brought in 9 tricks for +140. That didn’t IMP well against our teammates. South, in the 4th seat chose to double 1NT. Opener briefly considered 2♥, but passed 1NTX. North is now faced with a difficult problem. They are 3=2=3 in the unbid suits. Should they choose either rounded suit, they will be playing a very ugly 3-3 fit. Why they would chose diamonds is beyond me, but if they found a way to play diamonds, that would allow them to play a far superior 5-2 fit. But, N-S spots are horrible in all suits. In practice, they chose to pass and defend holding weak spade spots but the ♠AQ over the opening bid. With great splits for declarer and no communication/source of tricks for the defense, Bruce, in 1NTX, found 9 tricks and was rewarded with +580. We unexpectedly lost 10 IMPs on a nothing part score hand.
The last round had 3 swing boards.
We had a strange auction on Board 25. As I have mentioned before, we are playing an individual, so we have many unfamiliar partnerships and we allow discussion in the midst of the auction as to what treatments are being played. After a 1♣-(X) start, with such weak majors, (as South) I did not think a redouble was a good bid for my hand. I like redouble to largely show a misfit (some exceptions on 3 card support hands) with intention to penalty double a couple of suits that LHO may chose to bid. So, I asked partner (Mark) if we were playing flip-flop Jordan (where 2NT is preemptive) or regular (where 2NT shows a limit raise in clubs)? He replied ‘regular’ so I bid 2NT showing clubs, invitational or better. This is not a perfect bid, but seemed the best available bid to me.
But, later in the auction, the right to inquire about the bidding does not go so far as to ask ‘what does 3♦ mean?’ It turns out it was an attempt to arrive at 3NT, hoping/asking for a diamond stopper and making an invitational forward going bid. I took it as showing more clubs than diamonds (he had that) and a very minor suit offensively oriented hand (he didn’t have that!). He was simply trying for 3NT which is cold if you guess the hearts. Bruce explained later that his double of 3♦ was showing good diamonds (he thought we were heading to 3NT and wanted to alert partner to the diamond situation). However, not knowing what Mark or Bruce meant by their bids, I chose, over 3♦X to raise to 4♦. 4♦ would not have been a success. But, Mike thought Bruce’s double indicated his hand was much more offensively oriented to major suit play, so Mike decided to try 4♥ which I doubled. Eight tricks were the limit of the hand, so instead of our side going minus playing 5♣, we collected +500. I thought Mark had a hand like this, where 6♦ is cold but 6♣ has no play.
But, this was not the hand Mark held!
This deal really highlighted the mysteries of individual (vs. pairs/teams) bridge. Even with discussion for system agreements during the live auction when conventional options come up, bids are often made later in the auction which mean one thing to the bidder and something else entirely different to partner of the bidder. This results in large IMP swings that are somewhat random for all 8 players, 4 players winning and 4 losing. Specifically at my table, I think all 4 of us made rather poor bidding choices, starting with 3♦ by Mark (why not 3NT?), double by Bruce (why not pass), 4♦ by me (why not pass or redouble, showing diamond values? My bid took 3NT out of play!) and 4♥ by Mike (why not pass)!! But, I understand why all bids were made.
This hand also highlights the benefits of flip flop Jordan. It frees up 3♣ to show an invitational club hand and allows the opening bidder to become declarer in 3NT (right-siding) if that is a desired place to land. It also places the doubling hand on lead. Since he started the auction with a double, trying to find partner’s suit (lacking one of his own to bid), he may guess wrong on opening lead in attempting to find the suit where partner has help. Specifically on this hand, if the ♥Q and ♥7 were interchanged, South loses the first 5 tricks in NT on a heart lead while North is able to bring home 3NT if he can read East’s discards accurately.
Meanwhile, at the other table, Jerry decided to redouble at his first turn. That allows LHO to get in his heart bid, but on the lie of the cards, there is no suit that is an effective lead against 3NT. The auction continued to 3NT by North with the K♠ lead. Declarer won the 2nd spade trick, cashed all 5 clubs (squeezing East), but went astray in the end and finished down 1. +500 and +50, win 11 IMPs.
Board 27 saw the exact same auction at both tables up through 3♥. At the other table it went all pass, but as you see, at my table, my partner (Mark) continued to 4♥. This is not really a great contract, but it has the benefit of making. There are 2 primary arrows in the quiver after the ♦K is led. Looking at 2 certain spade losers and a possible trump and diamond loser, you can cash ♥AK and if the ♥Q fails to fall, resort to the club finesse to pitch the diamond loser. True confessions – I put all my eggs in the ♥Q coming down and was lucky to find it doubleton. Why? I thought RHO held the ♣K (but no bridge logic, just a feeling). But, with very limited entries to dummy, I feared cashing the ♥AK and then losing control of the hand if suits broke poorly. Not a very good excuse for playing it wrong. This is a classic Eddie Kantar hand where you try to include all of the favorable possibilities in your line of play that will allow you to achieve your contract.
So, at trick 2 I led back my ♦8, establishing my diamonds but ensuring 3 certain losers. After LHO won the ♦Q, I won the club shift and led spades. RHO went up with ♠K and led a club. I ruffed and finally played 3 rounds of hearts, drawing trump ending in dummy to cash the 3 good diamonds. +420 vs. -170, win 6 lucky IMPs.
Board 28, last board of the day, was an awkward auction that had a lucky ending for our table. As South, I feel I had an automatic 1♦ opener in 4th seat (15 Pearson points, 2.5 quick tricks, no question). Partner had an automatic 1♥ response and I rebid 1NT. We had the same auction in both rooms up to this point. But, at the other table, North decided to invite with 2NT at his second turn and ended the auction. On the spade lead against 2NT, the defense soon had 6 tricks (3+1+1+1) for down 1, +100 for our teammates.
Mark, North/partner at my table checked back for heart support with 2♣. I rebid 2♦ and he raised to 3♦ with his doubleton ♦K. Not a real elegant contract, but again it has the virtue of being unbeatable. When the defenders attempted to kill a spade ruff in dummy, they lost their natural diamond trick and I ended up making 4, +130 to go with +100 for 6 IMPs. Playing NT seems pretty normal on these cards. Mark chose a good time to support with a doubleton, avoiding the NT trap.
July 4th, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ No Comments
In the 21 boards, there were only 4 push boards and even those 4 offered opportunities for IMPs. That is, there were (usually small) numbers of IMPs flying around on nearly every hand with a potential comment (critique/compliment) available on virtually every hand. But, for now anyway, I’m only going to comment on the 4 boards that swung more than 5 IMPs. Bidding only accounted for 2 of those 4 swings (where, often, bidding defines all the swings) while the lead was key in the third swing board and defense/declarer play defined the last swing. The latter (defense/declarer) defined the swing on our first hand.
As you see, Bruce was declarer on the first hand. As the cards lie, there is no legitimate play for 10 tricks in spades (must lose 2 trumps and 2 diamonds), but Bruce brought it home. Bruce won the ♣A at trick 1, cashed his ♠A (noting the fall of the ♠10 as well as the power of his ♠987) and led the ♦3. His auction did not reveal the secondary diamond suit and when South saw the ♦3, his last chance to defeat the contract was to rise with the ♦A and provide partner with a ♦ ruff. When he didn’t, communication was severed preventing a ruff later. Bruce won the diamond in dummy and when the ♠8 wasn’t covered, he let it ride. He now had his 10 tricks, since he could now get to his hand, draw one more trump, losing only 2 diamonds and 1 spade.
I was declarer at the other table, with the lead of the ♠10. I, too, noted the power of the ♠987, but fearing a possible ♦AQx offside (allowing 2 diamonds and ruff for 2 spades for the defense), I won the ♠A at trick 1 and cashed the ♠K at trick 2, insuring (as the cards lie) 2 spades and 2 diamonds for the defense. At this point I had no play. Down 1 by me vs. 4♠ making by Bruce was a loss of 12 IMPs for my team.
The next hand Bruce was the star again. Many of us have read the David Bird opening lead books at least once (4 times, cover to cover for me, and I’m still learning). This auction (1NT-3NT) got more attention than any other NT lead/NT auction in the book. The auction was pretty routine and was the same at both tables. The lead, not so routine. The majors are not especially appealing, but the diamond suit is quite anemic, and entries later in the hand, after diamonds are established are pretty non-existent. I am quite curious what David Bird’s analysis would show as the winning lead in the long run. In any case, our teammate found the heart lead and now 12 tricks are cold as the cards lie. Bruce started with 4th best from his (weak) 5 card diamond suit and struck gold, down 1 when they took the first 5 tricks. Another red game lost, but with the over tricks at the other table, this time it was a loss of 13 IMPs for my team.
Finally a critical bidding decision. I decided to show both tables, since the bidding was so different. As you see, our opponents did not pursue 5♣, so we rested peacefully in 4♠ and when diamonds did not behave, we made 11 tricks for +450. Our teammate (Jerry) judged that the West hand was worth a 1 opener and when Jerry bounced to 5♣, his opponents did not pursue a penalty double nor 5♠, so we somehow won 7 IMPs on this one.
Last hand was another bidding decision and to show the radically different auctions, I’m showing both tables again. Most partnerships play lebensohl after a takeout double of a weak 2 opening bid, so I was surprised at the bid of 3♣. However, the net of that action was to play spades at the 3 level. The defense slipped a little and allowed 3♠ to make, so we lost 8 IMPs when I was raised to 4♠, off 2 for -200. As the cards lie, I can go down 1 less by ducking the ♦K lead and playing perfectly after that. However, I didn’t want to lose the ♦A with a trick 2 ruff, so I grabbed the ♦A at trick 1 and was headed for -2. With 3♠ making at the other table, my team lost 8 IMPs.
June 4th, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ 1 Comment
Once more, the bidding created the majority of the swings, but defense was significant on one hand. There were fewer large swing hands than most months, but I always enjoy looking at what decisions were made that resulted in the swings. I am also going to mention a couple of push hands that were of interest. Nick Wiebe joined our group for the first time today and was a winner. Congrats Nick.
Board 3 was an amazing push
At my table (top auction), North could hardly believe their eyes when the 1♠ bid hit the table. South was dismayed to hear the 4♥ splinter and signed off in 4♠. However, North wasn’t done. They made one more bid (5♥) to convey the diamond problem (and that hearts are covered). The auction ended with 5♠ and a diamond was dutifully led. After we cashed those 2 tricks, I just threw down my hand showing the automatic trump trick. South was stunned because they thought they escaped disaster by bailing out in 5♠. Surely they don’t have a trump loser?! But today they did. Push, since 5♠ was also reached at the other table with a dramatically different auction.
Meanwhile, at the other table…First, with 5-5 in the majors, Dan chose to respond 1♥. Then, with no control in diamonds (assuming the jump shift hand must have something there), tried RKCB. They signed off in 5♠ but were one too high like the other table.
My thoughts – I would always respond 1♠, but having responded 1♥, Dan had a chance. After the slam invitational raise to 3♠, a bid of 4♠ should guarantee no void, no singleton, no ace, no king in the unbid suit (diamonds). If you establish that agreement and stick to it, there is no need to reach the 5 level on any auction with 2 fast losers in both hands in a suit (that has been broadcast to the opponents).
Board 7
I don’t lead at the other table, but I think it was the same lead. I certainly don’t know the right way to play this hand. One loser in spades and trumps seems pretty likely and then hope to guess the clubs (which have no guess on this hand). I thought there might be a chance, if I kept the ♥A and ♦K in dummy, that I could achieve a club discard on spades in time to avoid 2 club losers. As the cards lie, 4♥ cannot be made…but, 4♥ was made at the other table.
Anyway, I chose to lead the ♠J at trick 2, covered with the ♠K and the ♠A winning. I next led the ♠10, continuing my theme of pitching a club eventually. RHO ruffed the spade, led clubs and the contract was doomed.
At the other table, trick 2 was ♥Q, ♥3, ♥5, ♥K. West returned a heart to the ♥A. Next the ♣J, ♣4, ♣3, ♣Q, In with the ♣Q, East has to decide what to do. Many clues ‘obvious’ in the post mortem are not so obvious at the table. Where is the ♣2? Can I cash the ♣A and give partner a ruff? Why didn’t they play a club higher than the ♣4 if they held 3 clubs (upside down count)? Why didn’t declarer simply draw trump and lose 2 clubs if they held ♣K32 (and 1=6=3=3 shape), making 2 club losers and the trump were all they had to lose? Why did partner return trumps at trick 3 if they were seeking a ruff? In any case, an attempt at providing partner with a club ruff saw the spade loser disappear and 4♥ came home. Lose 12 IMPs.
Board 9
The familiar refrain from Peter, Paul and Mary…’when will they ever learn, when will they ever learn?’ ‘They’ would be ‘me’ on this next sorry hand. When will I ever learn?
There are many maxims in bridge. “Never” sacrifice at IMPs. “Never” bid 5 over 5. “They” violated the first rule (offering +800), I violated the second rule. My excuse at the time was that partner didn’t double with secondary diamond values and maximum defensive values. But, he has strong offense as well. I feared a small plus on defense and thought that I had much more offense than defense. All weak excuses. I am going to swear off 5 over 5. When Bill, trying to make 5, ended up making 3, I had a brief hope that my stupid bid would be saved by the lie of the cards. But, when 10 tricks was the objective at the other table, declarer (Jack Scott) played carefully (starting with a small heart to the ♥J) and brought it home, lose 13 IMPs.
Board 20
This next hand was a modest loss, but it became the 3rd time in a week (the other 2 being during the Sacramento Regional) that I had been snookered by a 1♠ bid stealing the hand when 1♠ was not bid at the other table, .
Once (in Sacramento) Kit Woolsey had my hand at the other table. The hand was 1 shy of a ‘rule of 20’ opener (11 HCP with 5=3=3=2). But he opened 1♠ anyway. His partner bid 1NT all pass with our teammates never entering the auction. On this hand our teammates were cold for 4♥ and their hands were 5=4 and 3=5 in the majors.
The next time I barely had a ‘rule of 20’ opener and opened 1♣ with 4=2=2=5 and 11 HCP. Partner responded 1♥ and RHO doubled. I failed to bid 1♠ (due to misfit, minimum, …) and with ♠KQ105 and ♣AQxxx, I was soon doubling 4♠. No overtricks. LHO bid 1♠ with ♠AJ3 and RHO bounced with six small. I scored my ♣A and 2 spades, but that was all. Our teammates did not venture into the a spade contract when my hand rebid spades at their table. Now to Monday’s hand.
The auction was over rather quickly. I think Mike has a negative double over 1♠, but I don’t know how the auction will proceed from there if he had doubled. When he decided not to double and passed instead, we were soon defending 3NT. I led the ♣4, not wanting to waste the power of the ♣J10 and hoping partner held ♣9x or even singleton ♣9. That may be lame thinking, but in the end, it didn’t matter. Down 4, +400. But, with no 1♠ bid at the other table, East responded 1♥, and the opponents at the other table holding our cards arrived in a cold 4♥ contract. Lose 6 IMPs. It never ceases to amaze me what a monkey wrench is thrown into an auction with one little bid, resulting in wildly different contracts. Should we have doubled 3NT and collected +1100? I don’t see how, unless you just double every time they bid, assuming they don’t have full value for their bids. There is a huge amount of poker going on at the highest levels of US and World Championships. Call their bluff?
Board 21
Once more, an early bidding decision greatly altered the auction (and the lead). Jack Beers considered West a “1-bid” hand and bypassed a pretty fine diamond suit to bid 1♠. But, after seeing the jump raise, he liked slam potential, bid RKCB and hearing only 1 missing, bid the slam.
At my table (top auction), hearing that dummy would be 4=4=1=4, partner led the ♠A and a then another spade at trick 2. After this start, the diamonds only set up with a finesse for the ♦K. Since our declarer was only in 4♠, he didn’t much care. Diamonds were set up, but he lost one to the ♦K, making 5. When they were in 6♠, Mike, on lead, thought the ♠A was too valuable of a card to release at trick 1. He led a club, hoping that he might later win the ♠A and give partner a club ruff. But, looking at the hand double dummy against the club lead, 12 tricks can still only be made with the diamond finesse! A club lead was perfectly fine. In discussing the hand, we thought that the defense that started with 2 rounds of spades (which happened at the 4♠ table) was the only way to give declarer a problem (and even with that start, 12 tricks are still there with the diamond finesse). Without BBO, I can’t see where the defense went astray, but on the cross ruff, 12 tricks were made and no first round diamond finesse was taken. It seems (playing with the double dummy program) like the hand always goes down when declarer fails to take a first round diamond finesse. In any case, win 11 IMPs due to teammates bidding and making the slam.
Board 22 – another spade slam
When 13 top tricks are there for 7NT with no finesse and no splits required, you would like to think there is a way to get to grand. Here is an offer of a possible auction, but whenever I dream up an auction that shows THIS hand (in my mind), I always try to see if the same auction could show a similar hand, but, with slight changes, the similar hand (same auction) fails to produce the desired number of tricks. You be the judge.
Perhaps this is a fantasy auction? Certainly not one encumbered with a 2NT intervention. Anyway, I like to look at slam hands and slam auctions and try to see what I can learn about ways to describe THIS hand that will lead to slam with assurance. Many other factors are involved in an auction which include keeping the opponents in the dark. Perhaps the slam will be much more successful if the opponents know much less about your hand? Huge swings (good and bad) are produced by slam bidding resulting in many matches won/lost just based on the slam hands. Bad slams that make produce as many IMPs as good slams that make, making slam bidding one of the most interesting, exciting and dangerous areas of bridge. Of course with no ruff, there was nothing to the play. Win 11 IMPs when only game was reached at the other table.
No double no trouble. Our teammates went down 2 quietly for -100. Meanwhile, back at my table, there are several ways to defeat 4♥. The easiest is a club lead and later give partner a ruff. But, many of us in the group have throughly studied the David Bird books, so ‘what would David lead?’ comes up again and again. David hates trump leads. But he also hates leads from Hxxx(x). We are still left wondering what would David’s models show as the best lead against 4♥, since this auction type was not covered in the book. The actual trump lead still leaves the club ruff in play, but pard must put up the unlikely ♥K on the first trick and return his stiff club to receive the ruff. When he saved the ♥K for (a sure trick) later, the club ruff was gone and declarer only lost the ♦K and the 2 top trump, +420, win 8 IMPs.
Board 11 – one more push hand
As I said, I love to examine slam auctions to see what can be learned. I don’t know that either auction was better than the other, but I liked Bill’s 2-step approach to showing heart support. I was confident he had extras and they must be in the heart suit. But, the way we play, the immediate heart raise (to only 3♥) also shows extras (vs. fast arrival 4♥) and (I think) promises 4 card support. Grant Baze talked about slam bidding a lot. Weak trumps were a big slam negative feature – you cannot overcome 2 trump losers in a slam. I certainly had weak trumps, but decided to pursue the laydown slam anyway. Push.
That’s all for this week.
April 15th, 2014 ~ bobmunson ~ 2 Comments
While declarer play and defense are certainly important, I think bidding ends up establishing most of the swings in our IMP games (and in most of the IMP games in which I am involved). That was certainly the case today, mostly in terms of opening bids (or not opening the bidding).
Board 1 was a different bidding issue (what is your system to compete over the opponents 1NT opening bid?). I don’t know the system played by EW (at the other table), but they quietly allowed a transfer to 2♥ and sold out to 2♥, making 4, +170 for our teammates. I was East at my table playing Meckwell, so my double indicated various hand types including a single minor. When my partner doubled the transfer, he indicated he wanted to hear me bid out my hand. I didn’t think passing 2♦X to show diamonds and then bidding 3♦ to show diamonds made sense. So, I just bid 3♦ right away and bought it, making 3♦ for +110 and 7 IMPs. At both tables, the defending side needed to compete higher. Double part score swings are as much or more IMPs than a non-vulnerable game swing.
Clearly this hand was my ‘fault’ although I think many would not bother opening a 3=4=4=2 3rd seat hand with a modest 10 HCP and only 1 quick trick. However, ‘Munson’ 3rd seat openers have become a bit of a legend in our group and, even though that was me sitting in 3rd seat, I failed to find an ‘opening’ bid. How bad can that be? You wouldn’t think a passed hand opposite what could/should be another passed hand has a lucrative penalty waiting at the 2 level?!? Both tables played 2♥. When I led the ♦K, declarer won, continued diamonds, and had the ♠A as an entry to procure the diamond ruff in dummy. That got declarer’s total up to 5 tricks, down 3 vulnerable, +300. I’m feeling pretty good. Lose 13 IMPs! The other table was in 2♥X and without scoring the diamond ruff, they managed just the trump ♥AK and the pointed aces for 4 tricks, -1100!!!! What a difference that ‘opening bid’ made in 3rd seat!! And, in my opinion, no one did anything especially crazy. Schneider opened a “Munson 3rd seat” hand and Munson (me) didn’t!! I think this was the bidding at the other table.
Points ended up 20-20, but NS have no place to land. However, if North uses the principle of ‘only leave it up to partner if it makes no difference to you’ and makes a 1♥ call at the first opportunity, it would seem to me to be extremely difficult for West to double 1♥ opposite a passed hand. It could be right, and on this hand it is, but I don’t see the double of 1♥ happening.
Again a 3rd seat opener made the difference. My partner (knowing, as my partner, there were expectations in 3rd seat) reported he couldn’t live with himself if he failed to open 2♦ in 3rd seat. As you see, I quickly bounced to 5♦ and they quietly took the penalty, with my table losing -300 against the red game that our teammates bid and made, since there was no 2♦ opener at the other table to interfere with reaching their spade game. Win 8 IMPs.
Actually, when South (4th hand) opened the bidding at the other table, I think Bruce (West, holding my hand) made a Michaels cue bid. His partner (Jack) was saying afterwards ‘but I didn’t know which minor you held.’ Bruce and I have been ‘playing’ Questem for several years. That is a variation on Michaels where you always know partner’s minor (2M cue is the top 2 suits; 3♣ is top and bottom; 2NT is the two lower suits). I say ‘playing’ because every time it comes up, I forget. Why? Because when partner makes a 3♣ overcall of a 1♥ opening, it sounds like a club preempt, not spades and clubs! Embarrassing! Knowing partner’s minor makes a huge difference in many competitive auctions.
Normally, I add 1 point for a 5 card suit, and 2 points for a 6 card suit. But, I downgraded the doubleton ♣J and just considered it a 21 point hand. Regular partner Bruce felt that he would treat it as 22 and go through 2♣-2♦-2NT to show 22-23 (with other Kokish like sequences for stronger hands). In any case, both tables opened 2NT with that being the final contract at the other table, but partner raising me to 3NT at my table. The opening lead…was a long time coming. As Mike was 4=4=1=4, he struggled quite some time with what to lead. I’m not sure what David Bird would select for the lead against either 2NT or 3NT. Especially against 2NT he advocates safety, don’t give anything away. All suits look dangerous and it is a very tough choice. In any case, 2NT is cold on any lead. And 3NT is cold against any lead but a heart. If a heart is led, then it comes down to a 50% game (club finesse for the 9th trick). Sadly, I can’t take my 8 top tricks with a finesse for the 9th trick (the club finesse must come before running all the diamonds), so in the fullness of time, when the club finesse lost, I was down 3, -300 vs. the 2NT making 3 on the non-heart lead at the other table, -150, lose 10 IMPs. We got to a decent game that can never go down if the opening leader selected something other than hearts, and he almost did. 20 IMP difference on the lead (win 10 instead of lose 10). Darn!
The opening bid again made the difference here. On the auction shown, I considered doubling 3♦ to show values with no clear direction, but didn’t want partner to take it for penalty, so I simply bid 4♣ (which was destined to fail). Then, when 4♦ came around to me, I chickened out and passed. But, down 2, +200 proved useful when our teammates took their tricks defending 3NT and scored +400, win 12 IMPs. How did they get to 3NT? Dealer (West – Mark) opened 2♥ which was doubled by North and South decided to venture 3NT with values and solid heart stoppers. But after a small heart lead, the club finesse lost and 7 diamond tricks hit the table.
And, for the last board, again the opening bid made all the difference. Jerry decided to open the 6 card major with 1♥, but Bruce, not having the values to reverse, started with 1♠. I couldn’t decide if I should invite or make a game forcing bid, but eventually I upgraded my useful spade values and settled on a game forcing 2♦, and after Bruce rebid 2♥, I bounced to the spade game (fast arrival) to eliminate any slam notions from partner’s head. With nice spots and nice splits, 4♠ proved easy, +650. Our teammates defended 2♥, making 2 for -110 and 11 IMPs.
I leave tomorrow for the Regional tournament in San Diego, then leave Sunday for the Regional tournament in Gatlinburg. So, with leaving town, producing the blog was a bit of a rush this time. I hope there aren’t too many errors/typos. Reporting fewer hands than usual might help!
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